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Abstract  This paper tests the central predictions of the theoretical tax competition literature for 
capital tax rates for a panel of European Union countries, notably a race to the bottom in corporate tax 
burdens. In contrast to the previous empirical literature, empirical support for increasing capital mobility 
to be resulting in a reduction in corporate tax burdens is found. The results also suggest that other factors 
driving the corporate tax burden should not be neglected and may provide substantial counterweight to tax 
competition forces. 
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The theoretical literature on tax competition shows that under certain assumptions, increasing 
capital mobility within the European Union should result in a race to the bottom taxes on mobile 
capital taxed at source, such as corporate income. But when the restrictive assumptions that this 
result is based on are relaxed, the theoretical consequences of increasing capital mobility for 
capital taxation become more nuanced. As an example, different types of cross-country 
asymmetries, such as size of the country as well as degree of agglomeration of economic activity, 
may play a non-negligible role in determining a country’s choice of tax rate. In particular, 
agglomeration of economic activity may reverse the effect of capital mobility on the tax rate and 
in theory result in a “race to the top” in corporate income taxation. As there is no clear a priori 
answer to how capital mobility affects capital taxes, the consequence of increasing financial 
market integration and capital mobility on corporate taxation in the European Union should 
therefore be an empirical one.  
 
Turning to the facts, it has not been established beyond anecdotal evidence that tax competition 
and hence a race to the bottom in corporate income tax rates is taking place in the European 
Union. This is in spite of the fact that financial liberalization has been taking place for many 
years, and that capital mobility has reached high levels. A number of studies of OECD countries 
look for empirical evidence of a negative link between capital mobility and corporate or capital 
tax burdens, but do not find any. Instead, a few studies find evidence supporting the hypothesis of 
a race to the top. But the empirical literature is fragmented and thin and the result are 
inconclusive.  




In spite of the intense political debate on this topic in the European Union, no studies investigate 
panels consisting of only European Union countries. Moreover, previous studies have tended to 
use problematic measures of capital and corporate tax burdens.  
 
The paradox – lack of consistent empirical support for a theory that has gained political influence 
and a certain recognition – is re-visited in this paper, with the aim of providing more robust 
empirical support for or against a race to the bottom in corporate tax burdens in the European 
Union. As the main reason for the lack of previous empirical support for tax competition 
pressures can be found in measurement problems, relatively much effort is here directed at 
discussing how to best overcome the data and measurement problems involved in these types of 
panel regression analyses. 
 
Additional hypotheses derived from the tax competition literature are also tested, in order to asses 
the importance of tax competition as a downward pressure on corporate tax burdens relative to 
the importance of other factors as determinants of corporate tax burdens, such as economic size 
country, tax exporting, and agglomeration forces.  
 
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents five testable hypotheses derived 
from the theoretical literature on tax competition. Section 3 looks at the previous empirical 
literature on capital taxation and capital mobility and identifies problems and pitfalls in designing 
the tests of a negative relationship between measures of capital mobility and measures of the 
corporate tax burden in panel data. A methodology for testing for the presence of tax competition 




and presents the data and the results of the empirical analysis are presented in Section 6. The final 
section concludes. 
2.  Predictions of the theoretical literature on tax competition 
The theoretical literature on capital tax competition is reviewed by Wilson (1999). Five testable 
predictions are derived from this literature and summarized below and tested in the following 
empirical analysis. The first hypothesis, put forward elegantly in the seminal paper by Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski (1986), is the central prediction concerning capital taxation in the European 
Union derived from the tax competition literature and states that when capital becomes more 
mobile, governments will increasingly lower their source based capital tax rates in order to 
compete for and attract capital to their country. This will lead to a downward spiral in capital tax 
rates and too low capital taxes from a social optimal point of view. 
 
H1: The higher the capital mobility, the lower the tax revenues from and tax burden on capital 
taxed at the source. 
 
This prediction is, however, based on a set of rather restrictive assumptions about the economies 
in which tax competition takes place. For example, assuming that labor income can also be taxed, 
and assuming that labor is immobile across international borders leads to hypothesis two, which 
states that as capital becomes more mobile, the distortionary effect of capital taxation increases 
relative to the distortionary effect of labor taxation, and the tax burden will hence be shiftet from 
capital to labor: 




H2: The higher the degree of capital mobility, the higher the tax revenues from and tax burden on 
labor income relative to that of capital income. 
 
Allowing for differences in the size of capital endowments or population (economic country 
size), the elasticity of capital to the tax rate, and hence the distortionary effect of taxation, is 
perceived to be lower by larger countries, as shown in Wilson (1991) and Bucovetsky (1991). 
The larger country will therefore set a higher tax rate relative to the smaller country, leading to 
hypothesis three: 
 
H3: The larger the country, the smaller the downward pressure of capital mobility on the tax rate 
 
When agglomeration rents are allowed for, as done in the new economic geography literature, 
attracting industry to one location creates agglomeration rents, which can then be taxed without 
capital fleeing, in spite of capital being perfectly free to move. Capital becomes a quasi-fixed 
factor
1. Allowing for agglomeration forces hence has the potential to reverse the results of the 
standard tax competition model. Agglomeration rents will increase with the degree of goods-
market integration, which in the EU should be rather correlated with the degree of capital market 
integration. Moreover, modeling capital mobility explicitly in models of agglomeration forces 
shows that for certain levels of capital mobility, the degree of capital mobility will have the 
standard negative effect on tax rates while for higher levels, the relationship may reverse due to 
agglomeration effects. Disregarding the potential non-linear effects and focusing on the effects of 
agglomeration rents, allowing for agglomeration rents hence leads to: 
 
                                                 
1 See Baldwin et.al., 2003, chapter 16, for a thorough overview of tax competition in the presence of agglomeration 




H4: The more concentrated production, the smaller the downward pressure of capital mobility on 
the corporate tax burden 
 
Finally, financial liberalization also leads to increased international diversification of ownership 
of economic activity. Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) show that if the policy maker does not care 
about the welfare loss experienced by a foreign investor when she or he is taxed, the marginal 
cost of increasing the tax rate in terms of lost private domestic net income is lower when some of 
the tax incidence is on foreigners. Policymakers will hence have an incentive to increase the tax 
rate with the degree of foreign ownership of economic activity, all else being equal. The effect on 
capital taxes is called tax exporting, and has the opposite effect on capital taxes of the tax 
competition effect that has been in focus till now, leading to hypothesis 5: 
 
H5: The higher degree of foreign ownership of economic activity in the country, the smaller is 
the downward pressure of capital mobility on the corporate tax burden 
 
Whether or not intensifying tax competition has lead to the mentioned effects on the corporate tax 
burden in the European Union is an empirical question. The next Section summarizes the results 
of the previous empirical literature on tax competition. 
3 The  Empirical  Literature 
There are three necessary conditions for tax competition to be taking place. First, investors must 
be both willing and able to react to tax differentials between countries, i.e. corporate capital must 
be technically mobile across borders. There is no doubt that corporate as well as other types of 




European Signe Market in the early 1980s. This is further confirmed by measures of capital 
mobility for EU countries as will be shown in the empirical analysis below. Second, investors 
have to consider taxes as significant determinants in investment decisions. The empirical 
literature on the sensitivity of cross border capital flows, including FDI flows and bank deposits, 
finds that capital flows are indeed sensitive to tax rates
2. In particular, it has been rather robustly 
established that FDI flows are sensitive to host country capital taxation, while there is less 
empirical support for domestic investments to respond to domestic tax treatment. This means that 
there is scope for using tax policy to attract foreign capital to the country. A third necessary 
condition for tax competition to take place is that governments are able to actively use the tax 
policy instrument, and thus react to downward revisions of other countries’ tax rates, or to capital 
outflows, by lowering the tax burden on capital. Some preliminary estimations of tax reaction 
functions shows that national tax rates do seem to respond to taxes of neighboring countries, 
implying that strategic interaction in tax rates is prone to take place
3. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Since the empirical evidence implies that the three necessary conditions are fulfilled, a negative 
relationship between the degree of capital mobility and either absolute or relative corporate tax 
burdens should be present and thus somehow identifiable empirically, which would allow for an 
establishment of the importance of tax competition pressures. And it is at this point that the 
empirical evidence falls short of robustly validating tax competition pressures on capital tax rates. 
Table 1 summarizes the rather sparse empirical literature on correlations between measures of 
                                                 
2 See for example Hines (1996) for a review of the literature the tax sensitivity of US FDI flows, Devereux and 
Freeman (1995), Bènassy-Quéré, Fontagné and Lahréche-Révil (2000), Gropp and Kostial (2000) for studies of 
sensitivity of OECD FDI flows to tax rates. 




capital mobility and the tax burden on capital for OECD country panel data. The bulk of this 
research is inconclusive, and some studies even find slight evidence that capital taxation has 
increased with the degree of capital mobility. Only Bretchger and Hettich (2002) find the 
expected negative correlations between capital mobility and tax burdens, but the negative 
correlation is only robust when using a rather unconventional measure of capital mobility, 
namely trade openness. 
 
Regarding the empirical evidence for hypotheses 3 to 5, only Bretchger and Hettich test the 
additional hypothesis of a size effect on the tax competition (hypothesis 3) and find significant 
and expected effects, while none of the mentioned studies test the hypothesis that agglomeration 
rents mitigates or reverses tax competition pressures. Whether there is empirical support for the 
tax exporting hypothesis has been tested and found significant using firm level data for US 
states
4, but has not been tested as an explanatory factor in panel regressions on macroeconomic 
data. 
 
This general lack of empirical evidence for tax competition pressures to have had a negative 
influence on corporate tax burdens may of course mean that tax competition is not a significant 
force driving corporate tax burdens as of yet. But it may also be the consequence of problems 
with the empirical research design. Some such problems and possible solutions are listed below.  
3.  Problems, Pitfalls and Remedies 
For it to be meaningful to carry out another panel regression analysis of tax competition pressures 
on corporate tax burdens, the problems of the design of previous studies need to be addressed, 
                                                 




pitfalls need to be identified and remedies considered. Six problems and pitfalls and how they are 
taken into account in the following empirical analysis are identified below. 
1.  Imprecise or poor measures of capital mobility. The measures of capital mobility used 
in the literature may not adequately be capturing the degree of capital mobility. Finding remedies 
for this problem is not straightforward as capital mobility cannot be directly measured. The 
problem is accounted for in the following analysis by comparing the results of two measures of 
capital mobility rather than relying on just one. 
2.  Imprecise of poor measures of the capital tax burden 
As forcefully argued in Devereux and Griffith (2003), the appropriate measure to use when 
evaluating tax competition pressures empirically is the average effective tax rate on capital. It is 
the average rather than the marginal tax rate which matters for the location decision of a firm, and 
it is the average rather than the marginal tax rate which indicates the corporate tax burden. While 
using proxies for the average tax rate has also been the manifest strategy followed in the previous 
empirical literature, there are two overall problems related to the measurement of such average 
effective tax burdens which could account for lack of or unexpected results. Consider first the 
problem of the tax base effect when using corporate tax revenues to GDP as a measure of the tax 
burden on capital. Corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP does not take into account changes 
in the capital income tax base (i.e. some measure of taxable profits) on which the tax rate is 
applied. Hence, if the capital income tax base is positively correlated with financial liberalization, 
a positive relationship between the tax burden measure and the capital mobility measure should 
be expected. Seeing that the corporate tax base, as well as financial liberalization, is likely to 
have been increasing in the latter part of the 1990s, such a correlation is likely, and the tax base 
effect can hence be a priori expected to lead to a systematic bias toward rejecting tax competition. 




positive correlation between corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP in the previous literature, 
and should not be used as a measure of the corporate tax burden in empirical tests of tax 
competition pressures. There are other problems using tax revenues to GDP measures of the 
corporate tax burden. For example, the definition of the corporate tax base may change at a 
certain point in time, or incentives to register capital income in a certain category may change, in 
turn shifting tax revenues between the corporate and the personal income tax categories, without 
changes in the economic definition of tax rates or bases taking place. Such shifts in corporate tax 
revenues would obviously not be a sign of changes in the corporate tax burden. For these reasons, 
the corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP is not used as a measure of the tax burden on capital 
in the following empirical investigation.  
 
Second, there is the issue of the ex post nature of implicit measures of corporate or capital 
tax burdens. The construction of implicit tax rates a la Mendoza et al. (1994) is an attempt to 
solve the tax base problem mentioned above. Mendoza et al. suggest measuring the overall 
capital tax burden by dividing capital tax revenues with measures of the tax base computed on the 
basis of aggregate national accounts and fiscal data. Implicit capital tax rates lump all capital 
income and capital tax revenues together in one measure and it is mainly this lumping together 
which provides source of inaccuracy. First, implicit tax rates measure ex post tax burdens, in the 
sense that they do not take into account the effect that a tax change on a specific category of 
capital income would have on that particular capital tax base, and hence in turn on collected tax 
revenue. If taxes on a particular type of economic activity increase, this particular activity – and 
hence the associated tax base – may fall, and in turn, the weight of this activity in the overall 
implicit tax rate falls. If the particular activity was taxed relatively heavily in the first place, the 




increases in the tax burden on specific capital income categories is therefore uncertain, while the 
actual – or ex anti – tax burden has increased. Changes in the overall capital or corporate tax 
burden will hence not be reflected accurately by changes in the implicit tax rate if capital tax 
bases are elastic to their respective tax burden. If capital taxes are changed rather uniformly 
across different capital income categories this should be less of a problem. There are several 
additional potential problems relating to implicit capital tax rates. Implicit capital tax rates 
include taxes on bases such as savings, which are not as prone to capital tax competition, and 
more importantly, include taxes on tax bases which are not mobile, such as property income. 
Attempts at solving some of these problems by identifying an appropriate measure of the 
corporate income tax base in order to construct a narrower implicit corporate tax rate have 
largely been abandoned. But it is important to note that the inaccuracy of the implicit capital tax 
rate is not a priori expected to lead to a systematic bias which is directly or indirectly correlated 
with measures of financial liberalization, as is the case for the tax base problem mentioned above. 
 
While being inaccurate in other ways, a third measure of the corporate tax burden, referred to as 
the average effective corporate tax rates in the following, provides remedies for both the tax base 
effect and the problem of the ex post nature of the implicit tax rate described above
5. Average 
effective corporate tax rates measure the tax burden on a hypothetical corporate investment 
project as the difference between the gross and net of tax cost of capital associated with the 
particular type of investment project, using country specific tax code and various underlying 
assumptions regarding economic depreciation rates, inflation, type of financing and time horizon, 
etc.. The main drawback of using average effective corporate tax rates as measures of the 
corporate tax burden is that they are found to be highly sensitive to the underlying assumptions. 
                                                 




But there is no reason to expect this to lead to a systematic bias correlated with measures of 
capital mobility. As can be noted from Table 1, average effective corporate tax rates have not 
previously been employed for testing the tax competition hypotheses in panel regressions. The 
main reason for this is simply the fact that such data has not previously been computed 
consistently for a sufficient time horizon and for a sufficient panel of countries. But this situation 
has recently been changed by Devereux, M.P and R. Griffith (2003). 
 
As there are sources of inaccuracies associated with the use of both the implicit capital tax rate 
and the average effective corporate tax rate as proxies for the corporate tax burden, both 
measures are used for the testing of hypothesis 1, 3, 4 and 5 rather than choosing one measure a 
priori as the most appropriate. The sensitivity of results to changes in some of the underlying 
assumptions of the average effective corporate tax rate are carried out as robustness checks. 
 
3.  Omission of agglomeration, size and tax exporting effects. A positive correlation of 
measures of capital mobility could be due to an omitted variables bias, in that previous studies 
largely neglect to control for asymmetries in size, agglomeration economies and tax exporting. 
The robustness of the results are tested for inclusion of control variables for these effects in the 
following analysis. 
4.  Unit roots and spurious correlations. Another issue which is not addressed in the above 
mentioned studies is that of unit roots. Several of the variables used in the regressions may have 
unit roots, implying that there is a potential risk of spurious correlations, although the risk of 





6. The stationarity of included variables is checked for the purposes of the following 
analysis, and variables which are likely to have a unit root are first differenced. 
5.  Heterogeneity of the panels. The panels studied in the previous literature may have been 
too heterogeneous, by using OECD countries and including observations from the early 1970s. 
Moreover, it is remarkable that while capital tax competition and the potential adverse effects on 
taxation in European Union countries are frequently discussed in the public debate over the future 
of fiscal policy in the European Union, no purely European empirical panel regression study of 
these issues has been carried out. In the following analysis, the sample is limited to EU countries 
and observations from the 1970s are excluded while later observations (i.e. for the last years of 
the 1990s) are included. 
6.  Endogeneity. The dependent variables are fiscal variables and hence may have an effect 
on economic activity, and in turn, on some of the explanatory variables. This may be the case for 
growth and inflation, country size, agglomeration economies and foreign corporate ownership, 
while the effect of fiscal policy on measures of capital mobility is less obvious. There are no 
perfect solutions to problems of endogeneity, but seeing as the persistence in the explanatory 
variables which are prone to being endogenous is low, lagging the explanatory variables by one 




This following panel regression analysis takes into account the 6 points mentioned above to the 
extend possible. Points four to six are considered in the empirical methodology and procedures 
                                                 
6 See Baltagi (2002)’s chapter on non-stationary panel data. 
7 Using GMM or other forms of instrumental variables could also be employed, but seeing as there are no 
instruments which are no prone to exactly the same endogeneity short of the lags of the explanatory variables 




used, while the first three points are looked at in the robustness analysis of the regression results 
or included directly in the setup of the hypothesis specific estimating equations. 
4. Methodology 
Theoretical tax competition models do not provide a fully-fledged structural framework from 
which an estimating equation can be derived. Instead, following the empirical literature on fiscal 
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Where TAX is a measure of the absolute or relative tax burden on capital depending on the 
hypothesis to be tested. Tax burden measures are discussed in further detail below. υi is a country 
specific error term which can be fixed or random, while εit is the country and time specific error 
term. Inflation (INFL) and real growth (GR) are included to capture the cyclicality of the budget 
and inflation or growth induced changes in tax revenues due to shifts of income between the 
nominal tax brackets with different marginal tax rates. Growth is expected to be negatively 
related to the tax burden on capital
8. Inflation also proxies for money growth and hence also 
controls for monetary financing of the budget, and the expected sign of inflation hence does not 
lend itself to a priori identification. The effect of demographic changes on the government budget 
is controlled for by including the participation rate (PART), defined as the labor force divided by 
the population between 15 and 65 years old. The participation rate is expected to be negatively 
related to the tax burden. Cameron (1997) and Rodrik (1999), among others, argue that taxes 
                                                 
8 It can also be argued that according to Wagner’s Law, growth should lead to preferences for larger government and 
hence to higher taxes and expenditures in percent of GDP. But this is a longer-term argument as opposed to the 




should be expected to be positively related to the degree of openness of the country, and openness 
of the country to trade is controlled for by including the imports and exports to GDP ratio 
(OPEN). OPEN is cleaned of country size effects as proposed by Bretschger and Hettish (2002) 
by using the residuals from a regression of openness on country size as explained in appendix. 
The unemployment ratio (UN) is included to capture the direct influence of unemployment on 
personal income and social security payments, and is expected to affect taxes negatively. 
 
As a robustness check of the results to political economy influences, a dummy for partisanship is 
included, taking the value one when the government in power is defined as being to the left in the 
political spectrum (LEFT. See details on construction in appendix). A leftwing government is a 
priori expected to prefer higher overall taxes and higher capital taxes, all else equal, thus 
implying that the a priori sign of LEFT is positive in all regressions. Moreover, the lead and the 
contemporaneous values of a dummy for parliamentary election years (ELEC) are included to 
account for election year cycles. While the lead of the dummy is expected to be negative, the 
expected sign of the contemporaneous dummy is less clear as it would depend on when the year 
the election takes place. Finally, a dummy for the ‘Maastricht years’, taking the value 1 from 
1993 and onward, is included. Since the Maastricht Treaty imposes an upper limit to the budget 
deficit, the expected sign is positive in tax regressions, while not signed a priori in the regressions 
of capital taxes relative to other taxes
9. 
 
                                                 
9 A dummy for whether the exemption or the credit system is used as double taxation relief system is not included in 
the analysis in spite of this variable being identified as having an effect on the location decision of investment. This 
dummy would provide no time variation and would hence be correlated with the country fixed effects of the 
regression. Carrying out the regressions for either exemption countries or credit countries separate does not change 




It should be kept in mind when testing hypothesis two that the expected signs of each of the 
explanatory and control variables is not necessarily the same in regressions of relative corporate 
tax burdens (i.e. when testing hypothesis two). 
 
Ω is a vector of variables which are specific to the particular hypothesis tested. For the first two 
hypotheses concerning the effects of increased capital mobility on tax measures, the vector will 
simply consist of a measure of capital mobility, discussed in more detail in the section below. 
When hypothesis three on the implications of differences in country size for the outcome of the 
tax competition game is tested, the Ω vector in addition includes capital mobility interacted with 
a measure of country size. A positive sign of the this interaction term would mean that tax 
competition pressures on tax rates of larger countries is smaller, and would hence lend support to 
hypothesis 3. When hypothesis four on the implications of the degree of agglomeration for the 
corporate tax burden is tested, an interaction term between the measure of capital and a measure 
of degree of agglomeration are added to the Ω vector. Again, a positive interaction term would 
imply that more “agglomerated” countries are less exposed to tax competition pressures as capital 
mobility increases, and would hence lend support to hypothesis 4. Finally, hypothesis five is 
tested by adding a measure of foreign owned capital relative to domestically owned capital into 
the regression. The degree of imported capital should not change the impact of capital mobility as 
in the two previous hypothesis, but under hypothesis 5, a higher degree of imported capital 
should increase the tax rate. Thus, a positive sign of the variable measuring imported capital 
would lend support to hypothesis 5. The hypothesis specific dependent and explanatory variables 
are summarized in Table 2 and measurement and data issues relating to these variables are 
discussed below. 




Stationarity tests imply that all included variables except growth and inflation are likely to exhibit 
unit roots. Hence, growth and inflation are included in levels while the rest of the variables are 
first differenced in the basic specification. Including growth and inflation in first differences is, 
however, carried out as a robustness check. 
5.  Data and Measurement Issues 
The dataset used for the panel regression analysis contains data for 14 EU countries from 1980 to 
2000 (some series only go to 1997), and mainly includes data from OECD revenue statistics and 
OECD Economic Outlook, with a few exceptions. Details are given in Appendix. Choices of 
measures of tax burdens, the degree of capital mobility, the degree of agglomeration, size of a 
country and capital imports, are not straightforward and deserve further attention. 
 
As mentioned previously, two measures of the corporate tax burden are used for the present 
purposes: Average effective tax rates computed by Devereux and Griffith (2003) (henceforth 
referred to as CORPTAX) and implicit capital tax rates based on macroeconomic data computed 
by David and Rabesona (2002) (henceforth referred to as CAPTAX). The underlying 
assumptions using for computing CORPTAX are stated in appendix. 
 
(Insert Figure 5 and Figure 3 here) 
 
The EU average and standard deviation of CORPTAX are plotted in Figure 5. The plot shows a 
downward trend in the average EU effective tax on returns to corporate investments since the late 
1970s, and a reduction in the standard deviation, lending some initial support to hypothesis one. 




picture of an increasing trend over the last two decades, in contrast to the predictions of standard 
tax competition models. Clearly, visual inspection of plots of measures of corporate tax burdens 
is not sufficient to conclude anything about the importance of tax competition in the European 
Union. 
 
In lack of data on average effective labor or property tax rates which would be comparable to the 
average effective corporate tax rates computed by Devereux and Griffith (2002), hypothesis two 
is tested using only the implicit capital tax rate in percent of the implicit labor tax rate (henceforth 
CAPLAB) of David and Rabesona (2002). The EU average and standard deviation of CAPLAB 
are plotted in Figure 4 and show no clearly discernible trend, contrary to the predictions of tax 
competition theories. 
 
(Insert Figure 4 here) 
 
Two measures of capital mobility, which are characterized by having both time and cross country 
variation and are widely available for EU countries, have been chosen for the present study: 
Quinn’s 14 point index of financial liberalization (henceforth Quinn’s 14 point index, or Q14, see 
Quinn, 1997), and covered interest parity differentials on 3-month interbank deposits vis-à-vis 
German interbank deposits (henceforth CIP, see the exact definition in appendix). Quinn's 14 
point index is constructed using a scoring system to translate restrictions on not only outward but 
also inward capital account transactions, outward and inward current account transactions, and 
finally, the existence of agreements limiting the future use of capital controls, into a quantitative 
measure ranging from 0 (financially closed) to 14 (financially open). Figure 6 shows the mean 




liberalization in the EU has increased and the dispersion in the degree of liberalization has 
narrowed, confirming the general perception of how capital mobility has evolved in the last few 
decades in the European Union. 
 
(Insert Figure 6 and Figure 7 here) 
 
Perhaps the most important drawback of Quinn’s 14 point index is its discrete nature, since the 
sheer presence of restrictions does not necessarily convey any information about the actual 
impact of the restriction on capital flows. This drawback is addressed by using the CIP as a 
second measure of capital mobility. The CIP is based on the assumption that when the price 
differential net of currency risk between two identical assets of different nationality is higher, 
restrictions, formal or informal, to capital mobility must also be higher since price-offsetting 
flows have not been triggered to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity. Hence, in a regime 
of perfect capital mobility, interest parity should hold while the lower the degree of capital 
mobility, the higher a differential from interest parity is possible without triggering arbitrage 
activity. It is of course problematic that the CIP measures the international mobility of short term 
financial capital rather than the mobility of corporate taxable income. But as a line of defense of 
the CIP as a proxy for corporate capital mobility, it should be noted that the mobility of short 
term financial capital plays an indirect role in facilitating locational change in corporate 
economic activity. A plots of the EU average and standard deviation of the absolute deviations 
from interest parity is shown in Figure 7. The average absolute covered interest parity differential 
exhibits a decreasing trend, and hence indicates an increase in capital mobility over the past 20 
years in line with the picture given by Quinn’s 14 point index. The dispersion around the 





Real GDP relative to total EU real GDP (henceforth referred to as SIZE) is used as a measure of 
economic size for testing the hypothesis concerning the effect of economic size on the tax 
competition equilibrium. According to theories of asymmetric capital tax competition, what 
matters for the elasticity of capital to the tax rate is relative and not absolute size; that is, if real 
GDP increases in all competing countries in the same year, this should not matter for the 
equilibrium tax rate according to asymmetric capital tax competition models. 
 
Turning to the test of the agglomeration and tax competition hypothesis, hypothesis 4, possible 
tax rate hikes made possible by the existence of agglomeration economies depend according to 
theory on the discrete differential in agglomeration economies - returns to capital employed in the 
corporate sectors, or profits – across countries. As including some measure of the return to capital 
would give rise to substantial endogeneity problems in the regressions, agglomeration economies 
are instead proxied by real value added in manufacturing and services per capita (this measure is 
henceforth referred to as AGGL). Inspired by the empirical literature on agglomeration 
economies, a second measure of agglomeration economies is also used in the test of hypothesis 4, 
namely that of market potential (henceforth MP)
10. The MP, an average of real GDP of EU 
countries weighted by the distance to each country, measures agglomeration forces at play rather 
than the outcome – agglomeration economies – per se. 
 
                                                 
10 The empirical literature on economic geography suggests a list of variables relevant for agglomeration economies, 
including market size, trade costs and market potential. See for example Combe and Overman, forthcoming, for a 
review. The market size and market potential variables are highly correlated in the EU sample and only one of the 
two are therefore deemed necessary. Trade costs seem less relevant when financial market liberalization rather than 




Finally, a measure of the degree of foreign ownership of corporate activity is needed in order to 
test the tax-exporting hypothesis. Firm level accounting data provides this information, but such 
data is no available back in time and consistently for all panel countries. As an approximation, 
data on inward FDI stocks are used. Preferably, FDI stocks should be scaled by a measure of the 
aggregate value of corporate assets since what matters is the degree of foreign ownership relative 
to domestic ownership, not to absolute value of foreign owned assets. But in lack of available 
good measures or proxies of the aggregate value of corporate assets, inward FDI stocks have 
been scaled by GDP. This source of inaccuracy as a measure of tax exporting should be kept in 
mind in interpreting the results. 
 
Definitions of the various variables used for testing each of the five hypotheses in the panel 
regression analysis are summarized in Table 2.  
6. Results 
The results of the basic four regressions estimated for testing hypothesis 1 are given in columns 1 
and 4 of Table 3 and Table 4. The regressions are estimated using FGLS, allowing for cross-
country contemporaneous correlation of the error terms as well cross sectional heteroskedasticity. 
The Hausman tests for fixed effects against the alternative of random effects, shown in Table 3 
and Table 4, are accepted in all four regressions, implying that the fixed effects model is the more 
appropriate of the two one-way error components models. Moreover, the test for the country 
specific fixed effects jointly being equal to zero rejects the null in all regressions on a 10 percent 
significance level. The fixed effects one-way error components specification is therefore kept
11. 
 
                                                 
11 The R2 of the regressions are reported along with the results of the various regressions, but it should be kept in 




(Insert Table 3 and Table 4 here) 
 
Hypothesis one: The effect of capital mobility on the corporate tax burden.  Hypothesis 
one is tested by regressing CORPTAX and CAPTAX in turn on the two measures of capital 
mobility in turn. The outcomes of the resulting regressions are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. The 
parameter estimates of the control variables of the basic regressions (columns 1 and 4 of the two 
tables) are all of expected sign or insignificant except in the case of the participation rate, which 
turns out significantly positive in most regressions opposite to expectation. 
 
Starting with the CAPTAX regressions (Table 3), hypothesis one is accepted when using the CIP 
as a measure of capital mobility. This result is robust to the inclusion of growth and inflation first 
differences (column 2), and the inclusion of political economy variables (column 3) – of which 
only the election year effect turns out significant and with correct sign. The significantly negative 
parameter estimate is also robust to the inclusion of agglomeration effects, size effects and tax 
exporting effects, as shown in Table 7. (The implications of the results in Table 7 for hypotheses 
3 to 5 are returned to below). 
 
The result implies that a one percentage point increase in the CIP leads to a reduction in the 
implicit capital tax rate of 0.96 percentage points. While significant and robust, the effect is 
quantitatively small. The CIP increased by 0.8 percentage point on the average for the EU 
between 1985 and 2000, implying that the implicit capital tax rate has fallen by about 0.77 




On the other hand, when Quinn’s 14 point index of financial liberalization is used as a proxy for 
capital mobility in the CAPTAX regression, hypothesis one is not accepted (column 4 of Table 
3). Q14 is not significant in any of the regressions carried out for CAPTAX
12. 
 
Turning to the regressions testing hypothesis one using CORPTAX as the explanatory variable 
(Table 4), the CIP is significant in the basic regression (column 1). Here the estimated effect is 
smaller than for CAPTAX, implying a reduction of about 0.34 percentage points, or between 1 
and 2 percent of the average effective corporate tax rate between since 1985. This result is not 
entirely robust, however. First, the inclusion of growth and inflation in first differences instead of 
levels renders the CIP insignificant (column 2)
13. Moreover, the significance of the negative 
parameter estimate is not robust to changes in some of the underlying assumptions regarding type 
of financing of hypothetical investment project, underlying inflation rate and underlying rent, of 
the CORPTAX measure, as shown in Table 5. 
 
When using Quinn’s 14 point index as a proxy for capital mobility in the CORPTAX regression, 
however, the results are significant (column 4 of Table 4) and pass all robustness tests (column 5 
and 6 of Table 4, column 4-6 of Table 5 and Table 8). Since the EU average of the Q14 increased 
with 4 points since 1985, the parameter estimate of Q14 of –0.41 implies that the average 
effective corporate tax rate fell with about 1.64 percentage points, or between 5 and 6 percent on 
the average for EU countries since 1985 – a slightly more important magnitude than implied by 
the CIP measure. 
                                                 
12 The sample is shorter when CIP is used, as data on CIP does not stretch back further than 1985. This is not the 
reason for the different results for Q14 and CIP, as restricting the sample to 1985-2000 when using Q14 does not 
change the results. 
13 At closer inspection, this turns out to be due to the inclusion of inflation in first differences. As the first differences 
of inflation and CIP are not correlation (correlation coefficient of 0.03), there is no evident reason for this change of 





All in all, the data gives support to hypothesis 1, in indicating a negative effect of tax competition 
on corporate tax burdens in the past decades. The estimated magnitude of the reduction in 
corporate tax burdens since 1985 due to tax competition pressures in EU countries varies between 
1 and 6 percent on the average for EU countries. 
 
The tests for robustness to the inclusion of political economy variables provide interesting 
information in themselves which deserve mention. The parameter estimates for the Maastricht 
Treaty dummy comes out positive and strongly significant in all regressions but one, implying 
that the Maastricht budget restrictions have had a significant impact on tax policy in EU member 
states. Moreover, the contemporaneous dummy for election year effects is significantly negative 
as expected in all regressions. The dummy for partisanship, LEFT, on the other hand, is 
significantly positive in all regressions, contrary to the general perception of left versus right 
wing ideology. 
 
Hypothesis two: The effect of capital mobility on the corporate tax burden relative to the 
labor tax burden.  The hypothesis that increased capital mobility shifts the tax burden from 
mobile capital toward the less mobile factors such as labor is tested regressing the implicit capital 
tax rate in percent of the implicit labor tax rate on the two measures of capital mobility 
respectively. The regression results are shown in Table 6.   
(Insert Table 6 here) 
 
The results listed in Table 6 show that using the CIP as a measure of capital mobility leads to the 




only to the rejection of hypothesis two, but to the unexpected result that capital mobility has lead 
to a shift of the tax burden from labor to capital
14. The data hence do not allow a clear conclusion 
on hypothesis two. 
 
Hypothesis three: The effect of economic size on the impact of capital mobility on capital 
taxation  Whether the effect of capital mobility on the corporate tax burden depends on 
country size, as suggested by the asymmetric tax competition literature, is tested by regressing 
the two corporate tax burden measures on the two measures of capital mobility alone and in 
interaction with the measure of economic size of the country (SIZE). The results of the 
regressions are reported columns 1 and 5 of Table 7 and Table 8. Table 7 giving the results for 
the CAPTAX regressions shows that while SIZE itself is seen to have a positive effect on the 
implicit capital tax rate, the interaction of SIZE and the capital mobility proxy is not significant 
and hence does not alter the size of the impact of capital mobility on the CAPTAX.  
 
(Insert Table 7 and Table 8 here) 
 
In the regressions for CORPTAX (Table 8), the evidence is mixed. The interaction term between 
SIZE and CIP in the regression using CIP as a measure of capital mobility is insignificant, 
implying no size effects. Only in the CORPTAX regression using Q14 as a capital mobility 
measure does the interaction term turn significantly positive, giving support to the hypothesis that 
                                                 
14 These mixed results are of course linked with the finding that CIP was significantly negative while Q14 was 
insignificant in the CAPTAX regression carried out for the test of hypothesis 1. As Q14 was statistically significant 
and with the expected sign in the CORPTAX regression commented on above, it would be interesting as a future 
extension to test hypothesis 2 using the CORPTAX measure in percent of a similarly computed average effective 




a greater economic size of the country makes the country less sensitive to tax competition. All in 
all, the data provides some, although rather weak, support of hypothesis 3.  
 
Hypothesis four: The effect of agglomeration rents on the impact of capital mobility on the 
corporate tax burden  Hypothesis four, stating that the greater agglomeration economies 
in the country, the less the country will be pressured by tax competition, is tested for the implicit 
capital tax rate by including an interaction term between the capital mobility measures and the 
two agglomeration measures, AGGLOM and MP
15, respectively. The results of these regressions 
are given in columns 2, 3, 6 and 7 of Table 7 and Table 8. Again, the CAPTAX regressions 
contain no significant parameter estimates of the interaction terms and hence no support of 
hypothesis four. In the CORPTAX regressions on the other hand, the interaction terms of both 
AGGLOM and MP are significant and with expected signs when the CIP is used as capital 
mobility measure. When using Q14 as capital mobility proxy, the interaction term of MP is also 
significantly positive supporting hypothesis four while the interaction term of AGGLOM is 
insignificant. Moreover, the estimated negative effects of CIP and Q14 on CORPTAX increases 
in size when the agglomeration terms are included and significant, which could imply an omitted 
variables bias when agglomeration economies are not taken into account.  
 
All in all, the data provides weak support for hypothesis four that agglomeration economies act to 
mitigate the negative impact of capital mobility on corporate tax burdens.  
 
Hypothesis five:  The effect of Tax exporting on corporate tax burdens. The  hypothesis 
that a higher degree of foreign corporate ownership leads to tax exporting and hence higher 
                                                 
15 Market size (MS – the level of real GDP) has also been tested as an agglomeration variable but using MS gives 




corporate tax burdens all else equal is tested by including the tax exporting variable, the inward 
FDI stock in percent of GDP, in the CORPTAX and CAPTAX regressions. The results are given 
in columns 4 and 8 of Table 7 and Table 8. As in the test regressions for hypotheses 3 and 4, the 
CAPTAX regression yields no significant parameter estimates of the hypothesis specific variable 
and hence no support of hypothesis five. When including FDII in the CORPTAX regression, the 
parameter estimates of FDII come out significantly positive, as expected under hypothesis 5. As 
the inward FDI stock in percent of GDP increased by 14 percentage points on average for EU 
countries between 1985 and 1998 for which FDII is available, the parameter estimate of FDII of 
0.11 implies that tax exporting increased the average EU corporate tax burden by 1.56 percentage 
points, or between 5 and 6 percent in that time period – a magnitude similar to that of the 
estimated tax competition effect when using CORPTAX and Q14 as corporate tax burden and 
capital mobility measures respectively. In conclusion on the test of hypothesis five, there is some, 
although not entirely robust, empirical support for the tax exporting hypothesis to provide a 




Despite a widespread acceptance that a race to the bottom in capital tax rates in the European 
Union is taking place, no previous empirical support has been found for this. Several studies have 
even come to the opposite conclusion that capital mobility is positively correlated with capital 
taxation. This paper has highlighted some of the potential problems and pitfalls which should be 
take into account in the design of panel regression tests of the correlation between capital 
mobility and the corporate tax burden, and which might account for the lack of or unexpected 




analysis including only European Union countries and using newly available panel data on 
average effective tax rates based on national tax code as a measure of the corporate tax burden in 
addition to the more widely used implicit capital tax rate based on macroeconomic revenue and 
national accounts data. Finally, the paper has tested a wider set of hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical literature on tax competition, namely those of asymmetric sized and tax competition, 
agglomeration effects and tax competition, and finally, tax exporting effects on the corporate tax 
burden.  
 
The empirical analysis provides strong support for increased capital mobility to have resulted in a 
downward pressure on corporate tax burdens in the European Union since the early 1980. 
Estimates suggest that increases in capital mobility has lead to between 1 and 5 percent reduction 
in corporate tax burdens since 1985 on the average for EU member countries. Moreover, there 
was some, although not entirely robust support for the hypothesis that a greater economic size of 
the country, or greater agglomeration economies mitigate tax competition pressures on the 
corporate tax burden and the hypothesis. Further, there was weak empirical evidence that 
increased foreign corporate ownership has increased tax exporting effects and hence  
increased the corporate tax burden. Estimates suggest that the corporate tax burden has increased 
by between 5 and 6 percent since 1985 as an average for EU countries, providing some 
counterweight to the downward tax competition pressure on corporate tax rates. 
 
The main conclusion to draw from the analysis is that tax competition pressures on the corporate 
tax burden exist but have remained of relatively small magnitude and hardly qualify as a race to 
the bottom. Moreover, the results of the analysis emphasize that many factors other than capital 




harmonization. For example, in the presence of agglomeration economies, it is optimal to 
increase the tax rate on corporate income at the source unilaterally, and a harmonized corporate 
tax rate would prevent such taxation of agglomeration economies in agglomerated locations, 
which would be counter to the intention of harmonization in the first place. 
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Construction of an index of ideology  In line with the empirical literature on the effects of 
ideology on fiscal policy, data provided by Woldendorp et. al (2000) on ideology of the 
government in power is used. They construct a classification of the ideology of government along 
the lines of five cases. In the first case, right wing parties dominate both government and 
parliament. In the second case, right wing or center parties make up between 33.3% and 66.6% of 
government. Center parties make up more than 50% of government in the third case. In the fourth 
case, left wing or center parties make up between 33.3% and 66.6% of government. Finally, in 
the fifth case, left wing parties dominate government. Woldendorp et al. describes how the 
distinction has been made between right wing, center and left wing parties. On the basis of these 




(Insert Table 9 here) 






Table 1: Summary of the literature on regression analysis of capital mobility and tax burdens.  
Study  Dependent Variable  Capital Mobility 
Measure 
Sample Significant  Effects 
Garrett (1995)  -Capital taxation
/d 
 
-Index of number 




No significant effect 
Quinn (1997)  -Corporate Tax Revenues 
% Personal Tax Revenues 
-Corporate Tax Revenues 
% GDP 
-Corporate Tax Revenues 
% Total Tax Revenues 






Effect of Quinn’s 14 point index 
on corporate tax in % of personal 
tax: 0.443 
Effect of Quinn’s 14 point index 
on corporate tax in % of GDP: 
0.003 
Swank (1998a)  -Implicit Tax Rates on 





-FDI Flows % 
GDP 








Effect of Quinn’s 14 point index 





-Government Spending % 
GDP 
-Implicit tax rate on 
Capital
/c 
-Ratio of Implicit Tax 
Rates on Capital and 
Labor
/c 
-FDI Flows % 
GDP 








-Effect of FDI flows % GDP on 
Implicit Capital Tax: 0.419 
Bretschger and 
Hettish (2002) 






plus imports over 
GDP cleaned of 
country size 
effects) 
-Index of number 




-Effect of openness (index of 
capital controls) on implicit 
corporate tax: between -13 and -
20 (0 and -2.96, not robust). 
-Effect of openness (index of 
capital controls) on implicit 
labor tax in percent of the 
implicit corporate tax: between 
0.9 and 1.21 (0 and 0.12, not 
robust). 
/a: Covered Interest Parity Differentials. /b: Quinn’s 14 point index of financial liberalization. /c: Methodology 
proposed by Mendoza et. al (1994). /d: Garreth (1995) does not offer a more detailed definition of capital taxation. 





Table 2. Overview of hypotheses to be tested and the hypothesis specific dependent and explanatory variables used 
in the panel regression analysis.  
 
Hypothesis Dependent(s)  variable(s)  Hypotheses specific explanatory 
variable(s) 
H1  The higher the capital mobility, 
the lower the tax revenues from 
and tax burden of capital 
income taxed at the source 
Tax burden on capital measured by 
the implicit capital tax rate and 
corporate tax revenues in percent 
of GDP 
• Quinn’s 14 point index 
• CIP 
H2  The higher the degree of capital 
mobility, the higher the tax rate 
on labor relative to that of 
capital income 
Tax burden on capital relative to 
the tax burden on labor measured 
by the implicit capital tax rate in 
percent of the implicit tax rate on 
labor, and corporate tax revenues 
in percent of total tax revenues 
• Quinn’s 14 point index 
• CIP 
H3  The larger the country, the 
smaller the downward pressure 
of capital mobility on the 
capital tax rate 
Tax burden on capital measured by 
the implicit capital tax rate and 
corporate tax revenues in percent 
of GDP 
• Quinn’s 14 point index 
• CIP alone and interaction 
with the percentage of EU 
real GDP produced in the 
country. 
 
H4  The more production is 
clustered in a country, the 
lower the effect of capital 
mobility on the tax rate 
Tax burden on capital measured by 
the implicit capital tax rate 
• Quinn’s 14 point index 
• CIP alone and interaction 
with GDP per capita. 
H5  The higher degree of foreign 
ownership of production, the 
higher a tax rate on capital. 
Inward FDI stock in percent of 
GDP 
• Quinn’s 14 point index 
• CIP 





Table 3: The impact of capital mobility on the implicit capital tax rate (CAPTAX) 










***)  - - - 








(0.35)  -  0.04 
(0,83) 
-0,01 










*)  -  -0,07 
(2,57
**) 
∆GR-1  -  -0.07 
(-2.35
**)  - -  -0,07 
(-2,20
**)  - 
∆INFL-1  -  -0.12 
(-2.26
**)  - -  0,07 


























































MAAS-1  - -  -0,13 
(-0,70)  - -  0,50 
(2,31
**) 
ELEC+1  - -  0,19 
(1,31)  - -  -0,05 
(-0,42) 
ELEC  - -  -0,47 
(-3,42
***)  - -  -0,78 
(-6,21
***) 
LEFT-1  - -  -0,11 
(-0,62)  - -  -0,38 
(-3,53
***) 
No. Obs  172 172 136 221 221 185 
Sample  1985-2000 1985-2000  1985-199  1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 
R
2  0.19 0,16 0,23 0,12 0,14 0,16 




(p=0.72)     χ
2= 3.65 
(p=0.72)    
Wald (fixed effects=0)  χ
2=67.19 
(p=0.000)     χ
2=37.81 
(p=0.001)    
F-test (all slopes=0) 
χ
2=115.7 
(p=0.000)     χ
2=59.62 
(p=0.000)    




Table 4: The impact of capital mobility on the effective average corporate tax rate (CORPTAX) 









***)  - - - 












(0.51)  -  -0.02 
(-0.56) 
-0.05 










(0.01)  - 
0.03 
(1.25) 
∆GR-1  -  0.08 
(2.43
**)  - - 
-0.05 
(-1.25)  - 
∆INFL-1  -  -0.20 
(-3.78
***)  - - 
-0.06 
















































MAAS-1  - -  0.47 
(3.38




ELEC+1  - - 
-0.64 
(-4.81




ELEC  - - 
-0.81 
(-7.73




LEFT-1  - - 
-0.62 
(-3.29




No. Obs  187 187 139 252 252 204 
Sample  1985-2001 1985-2000 1985-1997 1980-2001 1980-2001 1980-2001 
R
2  0.07 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.11 




(p=0.58)     χ
2=10.11 
(p=0.12)    
Wald (fixed effects=0) 
χ
2=18.48 
(p=0.10)     χ
2=27.00 
(p=0.007)    
F-test (all slopes=0)  χ
2=45.51 
(p=0.000)     χ
2=32.77 
(p=0.000)    




Table 5: Robustness of results on hypothesis 1 to alternative underlying assumptions of the average effective tax rate 
(CORPTAX) 
  CORPTAX1 CORPTAX2 CORPTAX3 CORPTAX1 CORPTAX2 CORPTAX3 






(-1.34)  - - - 



















































































No.  Obs  187 187 187 252 252 252 
Sample  1985-2001 1985-2000 1985-2001 1980-2001 1980-2001 1980-2001 
R
2  0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.04 
DW  statistic  2.16 2.08 2.00 2.17 1.85 2.04 
***: Significant on the 1% level. **: Significant on the 5% level. *: Significant on the 10% level. 
CORPTAX1: Debt financed investment instead of finance through equity of retained earnings. 
CORPTAX2: Country and time specific inflation rates instead of a fixed uniform inflation rate. 





Table 6: The impact of capital mobility on the implicit tax rate on capital relative to the implicit labor tax rate 
(CAPLAB) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 








***)  - - - 









GR-1  0,11 




(-1,26)  -  -0,04 
(-0,36) 
INFL-1  -0,50 
(-5,02




(0,02)  -  0,14 
(1,84
*) 
∆GR-1 -  -0,09 
(-1,02)  - -  -0,17 
(-1,84
*)  - 
∆INFL-1 -  -0,26 
(-1,69)  - -  0,06 
(0,42)  - 






















































MAAS-1 -  -  0,01 
(0,02)  - -  1,75 
(3,20
***) 
ELEC+1 -  -  -0,07 
(-0,22)  - -  -0,59 
(-1,49) 
ELEC -  -  -0,86 
(-2,58
**)  - -  -1,27 
(-3,14
***) 
LEFT-1 -  -  -1,43 
(-2,97
***)  - -  -1,37 
(-3,85
***) 
No.  Obs  172 172 136 221 221 185 
Sample  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-1997 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-1997 
R
2  0,21 0,19 0,24 0,19 0,20 0,21 




(p=0.71)    
χ
2=4.10 
(p=0.70)    
Wald (fixed effects=0) 
χ
2=120.4 
(p=0.000)    
χ
2=82.86 
(p=0.000)    
F-test (all slopes=0)  χ
2=119.3 
(p=0.000)    
χ
2=82.09 
(p=0.000)    






Table 7: Tests of hypotheses 3 to 5 for the implicit capital tax rate (CAPTAX) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 











***) - - - - 











(-0,72)  - - - - - - - 
SIZE-1* 
∆(Q14-1) 
- - - -  0,02 
(1,05)  - - - 
∆SIZE-1  0,29 
(2,29
**)  - - -  0,31 
(2,35




-  -0,005 
(-1,26)  - - - - - - 
AGGL-1* 
∆(Q14-1) 
- - - - -  0,0002 
(0,12)  - - 
∆AGGL-1 -  0,09 
(5,19
***)  - - -  0,07 
(3,76
***)  - - 
MP-1* 
∆(CIP-1)  - -  0,0001 
(0,29)  - - - - - 
MP-1* 
∆(Q14-1) 
- - - - - -  0,0003 
(1,27)  - 
∆MP-1 -  -  0,001 
(0,21)  - - -  0,002 
(0,49)  - 
FDII  - - -  0,03 
(0,80)  - - -  -0,004 
(-0,10) 












































































































No.  Obs  172 172 172 160 221 221 221 209 
Sample  1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-2000 1985-1999 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980-1999 
R
2  0,20 0,22 0,19 0,19 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,12 
DW 
statistic  1,76 1,75 1,76 1,82 1,67 1,66 1,66 1,67 





Table 8: Tests of hypotheses 3 to 5 for the average effective corporate tax (CORPTAX) 













**)  - - - - 















(1.31)  - - -  0.08  
(4.95
***)  - - - 
SIZE-1* 
∆(Q14-1) 
- - - - - - - - 
∆SIZE-1 
-0.05 
(-0.41)  - - -  0.02 
(0.18




-  0.02  
(3.96
***)  - - - - - - 
AGGL-1* 
∆(Q14-1) 
-  - - -  0.001 
(0.58)  - - 
∆AGGL-1  -  0.04 
(1.64
*)  - - -  0.09 
(1.99
*)  - - 
MP-1* 
∆(CIP-1) 
- -  0.001  
(1.86
*)  - - - - - 
MP-1* 
∆(Q14-1) 
- - - - - -  0.001  
(4.45
***)  - 
∆MP-1  - -  -0.01 
(-1,68
*)  - - -  -0.01 
(-1.37)  - 
FDII  - - -  0.13 
(4.20









































































































No. Obs  187 187 187 163 252 252 242 228 
Sample  1985-2001 1985-2001 1985-2000 1985-1999 1980-2001 1980-2001 1980-2000 1980-1999 
R
2  0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 
DW 
statistic 
2.03 2.05 2.02 2.12 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.10 
 
 





Table 9: Definitions and sources of data used in the panel regression analysis  
Variable  Definition and Sources 
CORPGDP  Corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
CAPTAX  Implicit tax rate on capital calculated according to Carey and Rabesona 2002 on the 
basic of OECD revenue statistics. Net or gross?  Source: Carey and Rabesona (2002) 




As CORPTAX, but debt financed investment instead of finance through equity of 
retained earnings. 
CORPTAX2  As CORPTAX, but country and time specific inflation rates are assumed instead of a 
fixed uniform inflation rate. 
CORPTAX3  As CORPTAX, but an assumed 20% instead of 10% rent  
CORPTOTALTAX  Corporate tax revenues in percent of total tax revenues. Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook 
CAPLAB  The average effective tax rate on capital in percent of the average effective capital 
income tax. Source: Carey and Rabesona 2002. 
CIP  The yearly average of monthly (end of month) observations of absolute deviation from 
covered interest parity on 3 month interbank deposit interest rates vis-à-vis the German 
ditto, multiplied by minus one. Monthly data on spot exchange rates, three months 
forward exchange rates and three month interbank rates are derived from Datastream. 
Some series have been extended backwards in time using treasury bill yields when 
interbank deposit rates were not available. 
Q14  Quinn’s 14 point index of financial liberalization as described in Quinn (1997). 
Source: Dennis Quinn. 
SIZE  GDP relative to sum of GDP of countries included in the sample (EU13). Source: 
OECD Economic Outlook 
AGGLOM  Real value added in manufacturing and services per capita, measured in millions of 
dollars in fixed 1995 prices. Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD 
Economic Outlook 
MP  Market potential. Weighted sum of GDP for all 14 European countries included in this 







d = ∑ , i = country subscript, dij = distance between the capitals of countries 
i and j. i=1,…,n, n=14. Source: Own calculations based on OECD Economic Outlook 
data and distance data from TravelNotes.Org 
FDII  Inward FDI stock in percent of GDP. Inward FDI is approximated by an estimate of 
stock of direct investment liabilities (cumulative flow adjusted for relative price 
variations). Source: Dataset from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) 
GR  Real growth rate, calculated using data on nominal GDP and the GDP deflator. Source: 
OECD Economic Outlook 
INFL  The yearly percentage change in the consumer price index. Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook 
OPEN  The sum of exports and imports divided by 1.000.000*GDP (all in current local 
currency). Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
UN  Unemployment rate, percent. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
PART  The participation rate, constructed as the labor force in percent of the population 
between the age of 15 and 65. Data for Portugal are from the Ameco database. F or 
other EU countries, data are from OECD Economic Outlook. 
MAAS  Dummy for the Maastricht years, taking the value 1 from 1993 onwards. 
EYEAR  Dummy taking the value 1 in years of parliamentary elections of the given country, 
and zero otherwise. Source: Parties and Elections in Europe: http://www.parties-and-




LEFT  Dummy for the ideology of the government in power. Construction as explained 
above. Source: Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) 







Figure 1: EU average and standard deviation of 

















Figure 2: EU average and standard deviation of corporate 


























Figure 3. EU average and standard deviation of implicit 
































































Figure 4: EU average and standard deviation of implicit 
capital income tax rates in percent of implicit labor income 































Figure 5: EU average and standard deviation of the 




























Figure 6: EU average and standard deviation of Quinn's 





















Figure 7: EU yearly averages and standard deviation of 
monthly absolute covered interest parity differentials (-























Note: the sharp increase between 1985 and 1986 is due to 
the fact that Spain and Portugal, both with high deviations 
from interest parity, only enter the average in 1986. 
 